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The term ‘environmentally damaging subsidies’ covers all sorts of direct
and indirect subsidies with negative consequences for the environment.
This article presents a method to determine the environmental impact of
these subsidies. It combines a microeconomic framework with an
environmental impact module. The method is particularly useful for
analysing indirect subsidies. These are often hidden, and therefore, not
recognized as subsidies. Use of the method will provide a basis for
formulating corrective policy. The method is applied to several important
subsidies in the Netherlands, in agriculture, energy and transport sectors.
The results reveal large environmental effects, which deserve serious
attention from policy makers. To illustrate the specific features of the
method, its application to a particular subsidy, namely the exemption of
excise taxes on aviation fuels, is presented in full detail.
I. Introduction
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg government leaders have re-confirmed
that sustainable development should be a top priority
for government policy. Research suggests that many
current government policies and public structures are
still subsidizing activities to such an extent that
environmental externalities are magnified.
Governments spend hundreds of billions of dollars
to subsidize production and consumption in resource-
intensive sectors like agriculture, transport, energy,
water, forestry and fisheries (OECD, 1998, 1999; van
Beers and de Moor, 2001). Many of these subsidies
especially indirect types of support lead to unintended
but significant environmental effects.
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As opposed to direct subsidies, which are visible at
the expenditure side of the government’s budget,
indirect subsidies often are not recognized as sub-
sidies. They include various types of governmental
interventions, for example, tax exemptions for
particular groups, determination of minimum prices
for agricultural products and financial guarantees,
such as export credit facilities. A little known fact is
that most subsidies are indirect. This is partly due to
the fact that it is quite difficult to determine the
economic and environmental consequences of these
indirect subsidies, both in theory and in practice.
Although applied welfare economics offers tools for
the study of economic and environmental impacts of
all sorts of government policies, no specific attempt
has been made to address the environmental impact
of indirect subsidies. Standard public economics
theory analyses subsidies often as negative taxes
without any specific features assigned to subsidies
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
This article uses a microeconomic framework to
determine the environmental effects of indirect
government subsidies in a transparent and relatively
straightforward manner. The approach includes a set
of models for different circumstances and subsidy
types. In addition, it covers the assessment of a
number of environmental effects as well as aggrega-
tion and weighting of these into an aggregate
environmental index. Although the lack of govern-
ment policy aimed at internalizing external effects is
not considered a subsidy here, the policy framework
is also suitable to analyse and calculate the environ-
mental impact associated with such external effects.
Similarly, the method can be used to determine the
environmentally benign effects of subsidies specifi-
cally aimed at stimulating behavioural changes
towards less environmentally damaging consumer
(e.g. transport) or production patterns.
The literature on environmental impacts of sub-
sidies consists of two types of studies. The first focus
on qualitative analysis and formulation of policies to
undo the negative effects of these subsidies (De Moor,
1997; van Beers and de Moor, 1997; Myers, 1998; van
Beers and van den Bergh, 2001). The second type uses
formal models aimed at measuring the environmental
effects of subsidies. Different approaches are avail-
able. The most comprehensive of these is general
equilibrium (GE) modelling, which covers direct and
indirect economic effects of taxes or subsidies. Direct
effects relate to changes in the sector (inputs or
output) that is subsidized. Indirect effects include
income effects, derived changes in related sectors and
markets, and changes in demand, imports and
exports. General equilibrium modelling is a ‘heavy’
tool which requires many assumptions regarding the
behaviour of consumers and sectors, as well as about
model closure. In addition, many parameters need
to be estimated (see also Burniaux et al., 1992;
McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1996; Anderson and
McKibbin, 1997).1 When indirect effects are less
relevant or are of a known magnitude (e.g. a certain
fraction of direct effects) or when subsidies are not
too large, partial equilibrium analysis can provide
insight into the order of magnitude of economic and
environmental effects.2
Partial equilibrium analysis is restricted to a single
sector or an incomplete set of sectors (not covering
the whole economy). An example is the so-called
‘Marginal Effective Tax Rate’ (METR) method
(MacKenzie et al., 1997, 1998). It is based on the
assumption of profit maximizing behaviour of firms’
decisions about input and production levels, from
which it derives rules about the impact of taxes and
subsidies. Another partial equilibrium approach is
based on combining estimates of elasticities with
observed price differences. Larsen and Shah (1992)
and IEA (1999) use models along these lines to
estimate the potential impact of a removal of energy
subsidies on the reduction of global CO2 emissions.
Both this approach and METR require less data and
specific assumptions than GE modelling.
The present study is an example of the partial
equilibrium approach. It extends the existing litera-
ture by providing a general microeconomic method-
ology to estimate the environmental effects of
indirect subsidies. In contrast with, for example,
IEA (1999), it allows for dealing with all possible
incidence points of specific subsidies in the chain
1 This does not mean that we dismiss CGE models as irrelevant, but simply that for the single sector effect of specific subsidies
a partial equilibrium framework can provide a good (direct) approximation of the magnitude of overall (including indirect)
effects. This would be less evident in the case of policies or scenarios directly affecting large parts (multiple sectors) of the
entire economy, such as in the case of climate change (Kokoski and Smith, 1987).
2 Input–output models might be considered as well, as they allow capturing interactions among sectors. A main disadvantage
is, however, that they do not describe prices (and implicitly assume fixed prices), so that they cannot analyse behavioural
effects due to price and cost changes. As a result, these types of models are unsuitable to assess the environmental impacts
of subsidies.
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of activities and markets, and is therefore applicable
to a wide variety of subsidies applied to a range of
economic sectors. The approach is both policy
relevant and does not require too many data.
Of course, elasticity estimates benefit from available,
usually econometric studies.3 Two disadvantages of
this partial equilibrium approach are as follows.
When indirect effects are large relative to the direct
effects, the real economic and environmental effects
will be under or overestimated. Moreover, like all
other existing approaches, ours uses static models,
so that no attention is devoted to cumulative effects,
delays and technological innovation effects.
The definition of a subsidy is an important starting
point for our analysis. We have used a broad
definition, namely all government interventions
that directly or indirectly keep the price for
consumers below, or for producers above, the
market price levels. A useful taxonomy of subsidies
is as follows:
(1) Tax subsidies through deductions, exemp-
tions or special tariffs such as reduced energy
taxes for specific sectors or a low VAT rate
on food.
(2) Public provision of goods and services below
the cost such as infrastructure or associated
services.
(3) Capital subsidies such as loan guarantees,
debt forgiveness or government loans with
lower than market interest rates or under soft
conditions.
(4) Price regulation: policy measures through the
market mechanism shifting the cost burden
(partly) to market players; examples are
minimum prices for agricultural products
and maximum prices through price controls.
(5) Quantity restrictions: regulations towards a
minimum use of a certain input or product;
an example is the regulatory rule set by
Germany that electricity companies should
use a minimum quantity of domestically
produced coal.
(6) Trade barriers: regulation of imports through
rules, quotas and export credits.
In the next section the conceptual structure of
the method is presented. Section III describes the
microeconomic models that are used to translate the
policy framework into an operational tool. Section IV
applies the method to, and reports empirical results
for, eight major indirect subsidies in the Netherlands.
These relate to the production sectors agriculture,
energy and transport. One subsidy is analysed step by
step in order to show how the method works in detail.
A final section presents conclusions.
II. The Method
Introduction
The method is based on identifying a chain from a
subsidy to its environmental impact. This is captured
in the following three equations:
q ¼ FðPðsÞ,TðsÞ,DðsÞÞ ð1Þ
zm,n ¼ Hm,nðIðsÞ,TðsÞ, q,DðsÞÞ
for relevant values of m and n ð2Þ
Zm ¼
X
n
wm, nzm,n for relevant values of m ð3Þ
The symbols have the following meaning:
q¼output;
P¼ vector of production factors or inputs;
s¼ a subsidy or collection of subsidies;
T¼ technology;
D¼demand;
I¼ infrastructure;
zm,n¼ environmental impact of effect n in
general impact category m;
Zm¼ general environmental impact;
F, G, Hm,n¼ functional relationships;
wm,n¼weighting factor for environmental
effects.
The first equation gives a relationship between an
indirect subsidy and output, using as an example a
subsidy that directly affects production factors,
technology and output or production level. In certain
applications of this partial equilibrium framework
cross-price effects (either related to substitutes or
complements) occur and are relevant. Although
prices are not made explicit in the framework, such
effects may be taken into account when they have a
relevant magnitude. The specific mechanisms and
chain of effects are discussed in more detail in the
section ‘Economic effects of indirect subsidies’. The
second equation is used to calculate specific environ-
mental effects based on information about inputs,
technology or output. The third equation calculates
the overall environmental impact through weighted
summation. This is based on the identification of
3 Some studies directly combine econometric analysis with a partial equilibrium model to assess the impact of government
policies like subsidies (e.g. Giosa et al., 1999; Ostbye, 1998).
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general categories of environmental impact (e.g.
global warming potential). This approach is discussed
in more detail in the section ‘environmental effects of
indirect subsidies’. The environmental impact as
modelled in (2) can apply to either environmental
or pollution stocks or flows. However, for certain
stock effects a more complicated specification might
be needed to address threshold effects (e.g. nutrient
loading in lakes). The subsidies and related sectors
that we have studied do not require this type of
approach. Even the modelling of the effects of CO2
emissions can be accomplished with a flow approach
(namely, global warming potential), which reflects a
marginal effect of additional CO2 emissions on global
warming. Section III presents formal model expres-
sions of the above general framework that calculate
the economic and environmental impact of specific
subsidies.
Economic effects of indirect subsidies
The policy framework is illustrated by the stepwise
procedure depicted in Fig. 1.
First the type of subsidy is determined to identify
the specific model needed for the analysis. This is
followed by an assessment of the (monetary) magni-
tude of the subsidy, which can be regarded as a rough
measure of the magnitude of the economic and
environmental disturbance caused by the subsidy
under consideration. The next steps are formalization
and quantification of the mechanisms that determine
the economic effects of the different indirect sub-
sidies. The mechanisms differ between subsidy types
and can include a number of economic variables,
including supply, demand, prices, input mix and
technology type. In a subsequent step, the economic
effects are the inputs to the calculation of environ-
mental impacts. The end result is a quantitative
relationship between the magnitude of the subsidy
on the one hand, and the generated economic and
environmental effects on the other. Note that policy
filters may be required to correct for the impacts
of other government policies if these enhance or
compensate the effects of a particular subsidy. One
example is the combination of quotas and the subsidy
type ‘guaranteed prices’, which is typical for milk,
support in the agricultural sector in the Netherlands
(see the section ‘Minimum prices’).
The magnitude of a subsidy is determined as the
amount of money (prices or cost savings) or as a
volume of a physical product (functional units or kg).
If it is not possible to quantify the subsidy, this does
not necessarily mean that the analysis of the impacts
of such a subsidy will only provide qualitative
information. An example is a production subsidy
that stimulates use of another production technique.
A comparison of the environmental effects of the
different techniques is then still possible.
Determine subsidy type
Determine magnitude of subsidy
Adjust for policy environment
Determine economic effect
Quantify parameters
Environmental effects
Sensitivity analyses
Fig. 1. Policy framework for subsidy assessment
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From a theoretical perspective, a key factor behind
the impact of a subsidy on the economy is the point of
incidence of the subsidy in the chain of activities and
markets. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
A chain with three activities offers a sufficiently
rich framework to analyse both the flows of inter-
mediate goods and linkages between economic
activities (e.g. activity 1! 2), and the final products
going to consumers (e.g. activity 2! 3). The activities
are connected through markets, which transmit the
impact of the subsidy to other economic variables.
For example, producer subsidies can affect input and
output prices directly and the quantities indirectly.
The reaction of the prices and, hence, the effect on the
quantities produced are incorporated in the price
elasticity. The ultimate effect of a subsidy depends
partly on the kind of competition in the relevant
markets. An example is diesel tax reduction to truck
drivers. The fierce competition in this sector pro-
motes the transmission of the resulting price reduc-
tion to other sectors in the production chain. As a
result, the economic activity of the transport sector
hardly changes. Consumer subsidies like VAT-
exemptions affect the quantities demanded through
the price directly. Both an income and price effect
then emerge. A tax exemption for commuting traffic,
for example, increases income and reduces the costs
of commuter traffic. All these examples require
specific models for their analysis.
Environmental effects of indirect subsidies
In order to estimate the environmental effects
of subsidies, it is necessary to consider the relation-
ship between the economic effects as discussed
earlier on the one hand and the relevant environ-
mental effects on the other. The environmental
effects can be related to the inputs or outputs.
Where possible, we assume a fixed relationship
between outputs and environmental effects
(Equation 2). Five environmental categories are
relevant in the present study (Equation 3)4:
(1) Enhanced greenhouse effect: this covers
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (relevant to
both energy and transport), methane (CH4)
emissions (agriculture) and nitrous oxide
(N2O) emissions (transport and agriculture).
(2) Acidification: NOx and SO2 emissions are
particularly relevant for the energy and
transport sectors; NH3 emissions are particu-
larly relevant for agriculture.
(3) Photochemical creation of ozone: emissions
of volatile organic compounds (VOC) and
carbon monoxide (CO) occur in particular in
transport. NOx emissions are also important.
(4) Eutrophication: phosphates, nitrates, bio-
chemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemi-
cal oxygen demand (COD). The phosphates
and nitrates in particular are relevant in the
agricultural sector.
(5) Land use: although land use is not an
environmental impact indicator, its impact is
important in the agricultural sector. It also
plays a role in discussions about possible
indicators for biodiversity.
In choosing the aforementioned effects for this
study, we are focusing on the most important
environmental problems as indicated in the
National Environmental Policy Plan 4 of the Dutch
government. The decision to limit this study to the
effects on the most important environmental
themes is motivated mainly for practical considera-
tions; more indicators can easily be added in a
subsequent study, such as depletion of the ozone
layer, human and ecological toxicity, soil, water and
groundwater pollution, noise pollution, odour
nuisance, safety, waste and groundwater pumping
(see VNCI, 2001).
The analysis of the environmental effects translates
the economic effects – on inputs or outputs – into
Activity 1 Activity 2 Activity 3Market Market
Subsidy 1 Subsidy 3Subsidy 2 Subsidy 4 Subsidy 5
Fig. 2. Points of incidence of a subsidy in activities and markets
4 These categories are based on the Environmental Performance Indicators (EPI) method. See VNCI (2001).
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environmental effects. This is done using various data
sources and parameters, including those that were
available at the National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM).
Next, the general environmental impacts of emis-
sions in the relevant categories, Zm, are created by
multiplying each type of emission (in kg/year) in a
particular category (zmn) – e.g. CO2 in the
Greenhouse category – with a (unique) weighting
factor. Appendix A contains an overview of the
weighting factors used. The results for all the
emissions within each category are then aggregated
through weighted summation, which produces Zm
for that category.
Note that it is possible, in principle, for the
emission of a particular substance to contribute to
several zmn to which different weighting factors apply.
For example NOx contributes to three categories
(acidification, photochemical ozone creation and
eutrophication).
Finally, a sensitivity analysis will have to be
performed in which alternative values of the param-
eters will give insight into the reliability of the
calculated effects.
III. Formal Models
The method as presented in the previous section is
elaborated here in a number of specific formal models
to address particular subsidy types, as shown in
Table 1.
Each model presentation consists of two elements.
First, a formal presentation of the model is shown.
This indicates how the data have to be combined
so as to derive the environmental impact. The
availability of data is the main restriction on the
decision whether to include more or fewer factors,
and as an implication, to use a more or less
complicated model structure. Second, a list of factors
that together determine the environmental effect(s) of
a particular subsidy is presented. This suggests which
data are required to apply a specific method. Table 1
provides an overview of the determining factors per
subsidy type. In two cases a distinction is made
depending on data availability. Note that all
approaches are based on information about marginal
costs. Indeed, all subsidy types in the table affect the
marginal costs of production or the marginal utility
of consumption of a particular product. If this would
not be the case, no behavioural effect of a subsidy
and, as a result, neither economic nor environmental
impacts, could be identified.
A subsidy in the form of lower input prices –
dominance of the technology effect
Here, wemodel the effect of subsidies on the behaviour
of producers. This model is an extension of the basic
model – optimization of profit given a production
function that describes a relationship between inputs
and output –with taxes and subsidies. Althoughwe are
interested here in lower input prices due to a subsidy,
the extended model can be used to study a wide range
of changes that are caused by subsidies. Given the
static character of the model, long-run effects of
technological choices within companies, as well as the
effects on a higher scale (such as sector structure,
volume and composition of demand) are not
captured by this partial equilibrium model.
The company maximizes profit W:
W ¼ ð1 twÞ½ðpþ spÞQ C vþ db þ vþ dv ð4Þ
with production costs C
C ¼ ðpK  sKÞKþ pLLþ ðpI  sIÞIþ ðpE  sEÞE ð5Þ
and production function
Q ¼ FðK,L, I,E Þ ð6Þ
The symbols are:
W¼profit;
C¼ total costs;
Q¼output;
K¼ capital;
L¼ labour;
I¼ infrastructure;
E¼ energy;
p¼output price;
pK¼ capital price;
pL¼price of labour (wages);
pI¼price of infrastructure;
pE¼price of energy;
tw¼proportional tax on profit.
The possible subsidies are:
QQmax volume regulation on output;
p pmin price guarantee on output;
I¼ I*, and pI¼ 0: public supply below cost
price;
sp¼ subsidy on the selling price;
sK¼ subsidy on capital;
sI¼ subsidy on infrastructure (public provi-
sion of goods below cost price);
sE¼ subsidy on energy (including exemption
from regulatory energy taxes);
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v¼ tax-free allowance;
dv¼ tax-free direct subsidy;
db¼ direct subsidy (before taxes).
The subsidies Qmax and pmin lead to extra conditions
in the company’s optimization problem. The ideal
way to determine the effect of these indirect subsidies
would be to compare the relevant results of the
optimization problem (output or input, depending on
the point of application of the environmental effects)
with and without the extra condition in question.
Since this is not possible in practice, an approxima-
tion based on extrapolation of marginal effects will be
developed.
Rewriting Equations 4 and 5 gives an insight into
effective prices:
W ¼ pQ pKK pLL pI I pEE
þ ½tw  swvþ ð1 tw þ swÞdb þ dv ð7Þ
Here sw denotes a subsidy in the form of a lower
proportional tax on profits, and price symbols with
an asterisk stand for
p ¼ ð1 tw þ swÞðpþ spÞ ð8Þ
pK ¼ ð1 tw þ swÞðpK  sKÞ ð9Þ
pL ¼ ð1 tw þ swÞpL ð10Þ
pI ¼ ð1 tw þ swÞðpI  sIÞ ð11Þ
pE ¼ ð1 tw þ swÞðpE  sEÞ ð12Þ
represent the effective prices, i.e. the prices after taxes
and subsidies.
Since in Equation 7 the terms that include v, db and
dv do not contain Q, K, L, I or E, it follows
immediately that the corporate decisions that focus
on increasing or decreasing the supplied output
volume or the volume of demand for an input are
not affected by a tax-free allowance, nor by direct
general subsidies. This is because these subsidies
Table 1. Factors that determine economic and environmental effects, per subsidy type and according to availability of data
Type of subsidy Relevant data available Incomplete data
1. Subsidy in the form of . Magnitude of subsidy
reduced input prices . Parameters of production function
. Magnitude of relevant input
. Output price and input prices
. Pollution intensity of production
2. Subsidy on inputs in the form of . Magnitude of subsidy
tax measures (tax subsidies) . Price reaction in demand
. Output price reaction in supply
. Input price reaction in supply
. Pollution intensity of production
3. Subsidy on outputs in the form of 3a. Production 3a. Production
tax measures (tax subsidies) . Magnitude of subsidy . Magnitude of subsidy
. Price reaction in demand . Price reaction in equilibrium
. Price reaction in supply . Volume
. Pollution intensity of production . Pollution intensity of production
3b. Consumption
. Magnitude of subsidy
. Demand effect of the subsidy
. Pollution intensity of consumption or
production of consumed product
4. Public supply below cost price Like case 1
5. Capital subsidies Formal analysis problematic
6. Minimum prices . Currently supplied volume . Supplied volume
. Demanded volume at free market price . Demanded volume at
world market price
. Pollution intensity of production . Pollution intensity of
production
7. Volume regulation Like case 6
8a. Import barriers (trade measures) Like case 7
8b. Export credit guarantees
(trade measures)
Formal analysis problematic
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do not occur in the marginal rules that follow from
the first order conditions for the optimization
problem. Obviously such indirect subsidies do affect
the level of profit.
The decisions about the demand for inputs and
supply of output can then be derived from the
optimization problem as a function of the various
subsidies. This provides the basis for the economic
model. The first order conditions for the optimization
problem are:
@F
@x
¼ px  sx
pþ sp for x ¼ K,L, I,E ð13Þ
If we specify the production function as a Cobb–
Douglas relationship AKakLalIaiE ae, and define B as
B¼ akþ alþ aiþ ae, then we obtain the following
(output) supply and (input) demand functions:
Q ¼ Aðpþ spÞBðpK  sKÞakpalL ðpI  sIÞai
 ðpE  sEÞaeaakk aall aaii aaee
1=ð1BÞ ð14Þ
K ¼ Q
1=Bak
pK  sK
palL ðpI  sIÞaiðpE  sEÞae
Aaall l
ai
i a
ae
e
 1=B
ð15Þ
with the analogous results for L, I and E.
A number of insights follow. Note first of all that
effects on output and input depend on interactions
between subsidies, given that there are different
subsidies on the right-hand side in Equations 14
and 15. It also follows from Equations 14 and 15 that
the supply (or output or volume of production) and
the demand for inputs are not affected by a reduction
in the proportional tax on profit (sw). This subsidy
(lower tax) does of course affect the level of profit.
Calculating the partial derivatives from the right-
hand side in Equation 14 to the various subsidies
gives the marginal effects of subsidies on supply.
@Q
@sp
¼ BQ½ðpþ spÞð1 BÞ ð16Þ
@Q
@sK
¼ akQ½ðpK  sKÞð1 BÞ ð17Þ
@Q
@sI
¼ aiQ½ðpI  sIÞð1 BÞ ð18Þ
@Q
@sE
¼ aeQ½ðpE  sEÞð1 BÞ ð19Þ
As expected, all effects in Equations 16–19 are
positive (assuming that for inputs the subsidy level is
below the market price). The expressions also offer
the possibility of calculating the magnitude of the
effects, if the necessary data is available.
Calculating the partial derivatives from the right-
hand side in Equation 15 to the various subsidies
gives the marginal effects of subsidies on the demand
for inputs:
@K
@sp
¼ K½ðpþ spÞð1 BÞ ð20Þ
@K
@sK
¼ akK½ðpK  sKÞBð1 BÞ þ
K
PK  sK ð21Þ
@K
@sI
¼ aiK½ðpI  sIÞBð1 BÞ 
ai
B
 
ðPI  sIÞðaiBÞ=B
 p
al
L ðpE  sEÞae
Aaall a
ai
i a
ae
e
 1=B
ð22Þ
@K
@sE
¼ aeK½ðpE  sEÞBð1 BÞ 
ae
B
 
ðPE  sEÞðaeBÞ=B
 p
al
L ðpI  sIÞai
Aaall a
ai
i a
ae
e
 1=B
ð23Þ
Analogous derivatives can be determined for I and E
(and also L if it can be directly linked to environ-
mental effects, which is not obvious). The signs of the
effects in Equations 20 and 21 are positive, which
is as expected. The signs in Equations 22 and 23 are
negative, which is also as expected because price
cross-effects are negative in normal practice with
inputs that can be substituted (as is assumed with the
choice of the Cobb–Douglas production function).
It is now possible to determine the extent of the
effect of the subsidy. This depends on five variables:
. The magnitude of the subsidy (sj for j¼ p, K, I
or E ).
. The production function parameters (A; aj for
j¼ k, i or e; and B).
. The magnitude of the relevant input (K, I or E ).
. The output price and the input prices (p and pj
for j¼ p, K, I or E ).
. The effect of the relevant inputs and output on
the environmental impact (see Equation 2).
A subsidy on inputs in the form of tax measures –
dominance of factor market effect
When specific information about production func-
tions is not available, the analysis has to take place at
the level of demand and supply functions. This is the
point of departure of the following two approaches.
They are based on interaction between final demand
and supply of a particular product, which introduces
demand effects in the analysis. Partial equilibrium
analyses show the effects of an indirect subsidy,
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such as a tax-free allowance, on prices and volumes of
output and input. The prices are determined by the
interaction between demand and supply. Two types
of tax-free allowances are considered, namely on the
output price and on the input price.
We start by defining demand and supply functions
in Equations 24 and 25:
qd ¼ Dðp, pi, yÞ ð24Þ
We assume that a tax-free allowance – i.e. an indirect
subsidy s – applies to the respective product, so that
p*¼ p s, where p is the price to which the subsidy
is applied. The following conditions hold:
Dp*<0; Dy>0; Dpi<0 (complementary goods),
or Dpi>0 (substitutes).
qs ¼ Sðp,wiÞ ð25Þ
where:
Sp > 0; Swi < 0
The symbols stand for:
q¼ equilibrium volume;
qd¼ volume of demand;
qs¼ volume of supply;
p¼ price of the product to be subsidized;
s¼ subsidy in the form of a low rate of VAT;
p*¼ effective price of the product (including
subsidy);
pi¼ prices of other complementary or sub-
stitutable products;
y¼ aggregated income of the consumers;
w¼ input price.
The equilibrium condition is:
q ¼ qd ¼ qs ð26Þ
which is equivalent to
Dðp s, pi, yÞ ¼ Sðp,wiÞ ð27Þ
A subsidy s on the input price w leads to:
Dðp, pi, yÞ ¼ Sðp,wÞ ð28Þ
where w*¼w s. Combining the total differential
and obvious price changes, it then follows that:
Dpdp Spdpþ Swds ¼ 0 ð29Þ
This can be rewritten as:
dp
ds
¼ Sw
Sp Dp ð30Þ
The effect of the subsidy on the equilibrium volume
is then:
dq
ds
¼ dq
dp
dp
ds
¼ DpSw
Sp Dp ð31Þ
This gives the following marginal environmental
effect due to a marginal change in the subsidy:
dz
ds
¼ dz
dq
dq
ds
¼ Zq DpSw

Sp Dp
 
ð32Þ
If the magnitude of the subsidy is equal to s, then
the environmental effect is equal to:
z ¼ Zq DpSw

Sp Dp
 
s ð33Þ
The sign of this is positive. In other words, a given
change in a tax-free allowance for an input factor
to a polluting production process results in greater
environmental damage. The extent of that damage
depends on five variables5:
. The magnitude of the subsidy (s);
. The price reaction in the demand (Dp);
. The output price reaction in the supply (Sp);
. The input price reaction in the supply (Sw*);
. The pollution intensity of production (Zq).
Finally, note that it is assumed that the market price
w of the input is not affected by the subsidy. If it were
affected, then a more complicated expression than
Equation 33 would result and additional information
would be needed.
A subsidy on output in the form of tax measures –
dominance of market effect
Production. We start immediately with the equilib-
rium condition in Equation 27. In order to find the
effect on the equilibrium price, the equilibrium
volume and the external effect, the total differential
is determined:
Dpðdp dsÞ þDpidpi þDydy Spdp
 Ssds Swidwi ¼ 0 ð34Þ
The subsidy has an effect on the equilibrium price
and the equilibrium volume. We can therefore
suppose that dpi¼ dy¼ dwi¼ 0, which leads to:
Dpðdp dsÞ  Spdp ¼ 0 ð35Þ
5 Price reaction of demand (or supply)’ means: the absolute change in the demanded (supplied) volume that occurs in reaction
to a given price change. ‘Price elasticity of the equilibrium volume’ means: the relative change in the demanded volume
(with respect to the equilibrium state) as a result of a relative price change of 1%.
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It then follows that:
dp
ds
¼ Dp
Dp  Sp ð36Þ
Here, we are mainly interested in the effect of the
subsidy on the equilibrium volume since that is the
point of application for environmental effects in this
model. This effect can be determined as follows:
dq
ds
¼ dq
dp
dp
ds
¼ Dp dp
ds
 1
 
¼ DpSp
Dp  Sp ð37Þ
Note that the sign here is positive. This means that a
higher subsidy (lower VAT) stimulates consumption
and thereby production of the product in question.
We next assume a positive dependence of an
environmental effect z on the produced equilibrium
volume, such that:
z ¼ ZðqÞ ð38Þ
with
Zq > 0
From Equations 37 and 38 it can be derived that the
environmental effect of the subsidy is equal to:
dz
ds
¼ dz
dq
dq
ds
¼ Zq DpSp
Dp  Sp ð39Þ
The effect in Equation 39 is a marginal effect that can
be considered the average effect for relatively small
changes. In other words, if the magnitude of the
subsidy is s, then the environmental effect is
equal to:
z ¼ Zq DpSp
Dp  Sps ð40Þ
The sign here is positive, i.e. the effect of the subsidy
(a low rate of VAT) on the environmental impact of
production is positive. The environmental impact
of the subsidy thus depends on four variables:
. The magnitude of the subsidy (s);
. The price reaction in the demand (Dp*);
. The price reaction in the supply (Sp);
. The pollution intensity of production (Zq).
The second variable in this list depends on the type of
product (e.g. necessity or luxury) and on consumers’
preferences. The third element reflects the production
costs of the company (or sector), and indirectly also
substitution possibilities in the input mix, availability
of alternative production techniques, and the compe-
titive situation on the sales market.
Note that Equation 40 can also be expressed in
terms of price elasticities of demand and supply.
Most price elasticities already include the interaction
between demand and supply. In this case a more
simple equation can be used:
z ¼ Zqepq

p
 
s ð41Þ
where ep is the price elasticity of the equilibrium
volume. The environmental impact of the subsidy
then depends on four variables:
. The magnitude of the subsidy (s);
. The price elasticity of the equilibrium volume
(ep*);
. The equilibrium volume and price (q* and p*);
. The degree of pollution from production (Zq).
If separate information is not available about supply
and demand, Equation 41 provides an adequate
approach to calculate the environmental effects.
Effect of subsidies on consumer decisions. A model
is presented here that reflects the effect of subsidies
on consumer decisions. Consumer subsidies are to be
expected in particular in the transport and tourism
sectors. Think of the flat-rate allowance for travel
costs or the exemption from VAT on airline tickets,
for example. As with the model for producers’
decisions, we will first consider the general problem
and then a specific example using functional specifi-
cations of the utility function.
The consumer maximizes utility subject to the
parameter condition of his budget. In general terms,
the utility function can be expressed as follows:
U ¼ Uðx1, . . . , xk, . . . , xnÞ ð42Þ
The budget restriction is as follows:
ð1 tyÞðy f Þ ¼
Xn
i¼1
ðpi  siÞxi ð43Þ
With:
U¼utility;
y¼ income;
ty¼ income tax;
f¼ subsidy via a flat-rate allowance;
xi¼ consumption of product i (i¼ 1, . . . , n);
pi¼price of product i;
si¼price subsidy on product i.
Elaboration of this maximization problem yields the
following demand functions:
xi ¼ Diðp1  s1, . . . , pk  sk, . . . , pn  sn, y, f, tyÞ ð44Þ
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with:
@xi
@y
> 0
@xi
@f
> 0
@xi
@ty
< 0
ð45Þ
Let us suppose that not all goods are subject to a
subsidy: si¼ 1 for i¼ k and si¼ 0 for i 6¼ k. In the case
of substitution between the goods the following
applies:
@xi
@sk
> 0 for i ¼ k ð46aÞ
@xi
@sk
< 0 for i 6¼ k ð46bÞ
In the case of complementary goods the following
applies:
@xi
@sk
> 0 for all i ð47Þ
We work this out by specifying a Cobb–Douglas
production function for two products, such as public
transport (x1) and subsidized private use of cars (x2).
The utility function is:
U ¼ xa11 xa22 ð48Þ
This function is maximized under the parameter
condition of the budget restriction:
ð1 tyÞðy f Þ ¼ p1x1 þ ðp2  s2Þx2 ð49Þ
Solving this system gives the demand functions for
x1 and x2:
x1 ¼ a1ð1 tyÞðy f Þða1 þ a2Þp1 ð50aÞ
x2 ¼ a2ð1 tyÞðy f Þyða1 þ a2Þðp2  s2Þ ð50bÞ
Differentiating to s2 only affects the demand for the
‘own’ product, x2. A larger subsidy leads to a larger
demand for the product on which the subsidy is
given, as is shown by the following partial derivative:
@x2
@s2
¼ a2ða1 þ a2Þð1 tyÞðy f Þfða1 þ a2Þðp2  s2Þg2
> 0 ð51Þ
Differentiating to the flat-rate allowance f affects the
demand for both products:
@x1
@f
¼ a1ðty þ 1Þða1 þ a2Þp1 > 0 ð52aÞ
@x2
@f
¼ a2ðty þ 1Þfða1 þ a2Þðp2  s2Þg2
ð52bÞ
The Cobb–Douglas specification implies that the
cross-elasticities are zero. In transport, for
example, low values for such elasticities can be
substantiated based on the fact that the transfer
from private to public transport is difficult due to
lock-in effects.
The connection with the environmental impact is
made via Equation 2:
z ¼ s@xi
@skZq
ð53Þ
The extent to which tax affects the environmental
depends on the following variables:
. The magnitude of the subsidy (s);
. The effect of the subsidy on demand (@xi/@sk).
This effect depends on the assumed functional
specification of the utility function. Here there is
a choice between various equations. It is also
possible for a subsidy to produce cross-effects.
In that case the effects should be added together.
However, in practice this is of limited relevance
since the cross-effects are relatively small com-
pared to the ‘own’ effects.
. The degree of pollution from use or production
of the consumed product to which the subsidy
applies (Zq).
Public supply below cost price
This amounts to determining the effect of a reduction
in the input price and involves using the approach
described in the subsections Production or ‘Effect of
subsidies on consumer decisions’.
Capital subsidies
It is very difficult to quantify the economic effects,
and consequently the environmental effects, of capital
subsidies. This is because these subsidies change the
conditions under which companies take decisions
about investments. The specific expertise and infor-
mation on such effects may well be available in the
field of corporate financing, but a more detailed
analysis is outside the scope of this study. Only in
specific cases it is possible to carry out an analysis
using a different approach. For example, in the case
of low return on a government share in an airport the
indirect subsidy is in the form of low airport taxes,
which allows carrying out an analysis as presented
in the subsection ‘Effect of subsidies on consumer
decisions’.
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Minimum prices
As shown in Fig. 3, a producer reacts to a minimum
price pg> pe (¼market equilibrium price) by produc-
ing more and offering more of the product for sale
than the equilibrium volume (qe). Consumers on the
other hand reduce the volume of demand for the
product because the price is higher. This creates a
surplus that is accompanied by an extra subsidy
transfer compared with the situation where qe is
offered for sale at price pg. The total subsidy transfer
is cdpgpe.
The environmental effect of the price guarantee
is expressed as follows:
z ¼ ðqsg  qeÞZq ð54Þ
The volume effect (first part of the term on the
right-hand side) can be derived from Equation 54.
The following information is required to apply this
equation:
. Supply with price guarantee, i.e. in the current
situation (qsg);
. Supply at free market price (qe). This requires
hypothetical data, which in some cases can be
based on earlier studies (e.g. with CGE models).
Note that if the applicable world market price
(pw) is not equal to the domestic free market
price (pe), the supplied volume qe in the equation
should be replaced by qw;
. The degree of pollution from production (Zq).
Volume regulation
Since volume regulation and minimum prices usually
go together, the method as described in the subsection
‘Minimum prices’ is relevant.
Trade measures: import barriers
The same applies here as in the section ‘Volume
regulation’ since import barriers are a special type
of volume regulation.
IV. Empirical Application of the Models
General
The method of the previous section has been applied
to a variety of indirect subsidies within the sectors
agriculture, energy production, and transport (van
Beers et al., 2002). In making a selection of cases,
a balanced distribution was aimed for in terms of
subsidy types, subsidy size, the expected impact on
producing and consuming activities, and the expected
order of magnitude of the environmental impact.
In the application to agriculture, two producer
subsidies were chosen (minimum prices for milk/dairy
and the designation of agricultural land in land use
planning) and one consumer subsidy (low VAT rate
on meat). In the application to the energy sector, the
exemption from the energy tax (REB) for large users
was selected (a producer subsidy). In the application
to transport sector, the exemption from excise tax for
aviation fuels (worked out in detail subsequently), tax
deduction for use of public transport in commuter
traffic, incomplete coverage of rail infrastructure
costs and low profitability of the government’s
share in Schiphol airport were analysed.
The applications show that sizable indirect sub-
sidies can bring about relatively large environmental
impacts (Table 2). This is particularly true for the
subsidies given through the energy tax, milk price
support and designation of agricultural land, which
all interfere in an early stage in the production–
consumption chain. The excise tax exemption for
aviation fuels also has a substantial environmental
impact. In these cases the values of the elasticities
of demand play an important role. More limited
environmental effects were found for the other
subsidies.
The final row of Table 2 presents some information
on policy goals, which serves as a benchmark for
judging the magnitude of the various environmental
impacts of subsidies listed in the table. It shows, for
instance, that the small sample of subsidies consid-
ered here contributes to the emission of greenhouse
gases to an extent equal to approximately 30% of the
required reduction, and to the emission of acidifying
D
S
qe
pe
pg
qdg q
s
g
a
b c
d
p
q
e
f
pw
qw
Fig. 3. The economic effect of minimum prices
qi¼ volume of the product (volume of supply or
demand); pi¼ price of the product; D¼ demand curve;
S¼ supply curve (marginal private costs).
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emissions to an extent equal to even 46% of the
required reduction, in the Netherlands in 2002.
An excise exemption on aviation fuel
Theoretical background. We illustrate the general
approach by presenting the details of an analysis of
the environmental impact of one particular subsidy,
namely the exemption from excise tax for aviation
fuels. If the size of the subsidy is equal to s, the
environmental effect is described by Equation 33:
z ¼ Zq DpSw
Sp Dp
 
s ð33Þ
where
z¼ the environmental change;
s¼ the magnitude of the subsidy (assuming
that the subsidy is introduced);
Dp¼ price reaction of demand for air travel
(Dp<0);
Sp¼ output price reaction of supply of air
travel (Sp>0);
Sw*¼ input price reaction of supply of air travel
(Sw*<0);
Zq¼ the pollution intensity of production
(Zq>0).
The sign of the right-hand expression in Equation 33
is positive. In other words, a given change in a
tax-free allowance for an input factor to a polluting
production process results in greater environmental
change. Equation 33 shows that the environmental
effect relates to four variables: the magnitude of the
input subsidy, the price reaction of demand for air
traffic, the output price reaction of supply of air
traffic and the input price reaction of supply, i.e. the
impact of the kerosene price on air traffic supply.
As there were no specific data on the price
reactions of demand and supply, we have assumed
that empirical price elasticities already incorporate
the interaction between demand and supply.
Additionally, we assume that the kerosene subsidy
directly affects the output price by the share of fuel
costs in total costs. The equation then becomes:
z ¼ Zq dq
ds
¼ Zq"p q
w
s ð55Þ
with:
¼ extent to which total production costs are
made up of fuel costs (or extent to which
the price of a ticket, which is assumed to
be equivalent here, is determined by fuel
costs);
"p¼price elasticity of demand (measured as
an absolute value);
q¼ extent of air traffic activity;
w*¼price of aviation fuel (lowered with
subsidy).
The environmental effects of the excise duty
exemption on kerosene have been calculated by
assigning the parameter values in Equation 55
step-by-step.
Extent of environmental effects per unit of activity
(Zq). The environmental effects of aviation depend
greatly on the type of aircraft (engine), the distance
flown, the altitude at which the aircraft flies and the
capacity utilization. Dings et al (2002) presents
emission data for four combinations of aircraft
types and flown distances (Table 3).
It is now possible, assuming average capacity
utilization for the four aircraft types, to estimate the
emissions per passenger-kilometre (Table 4).
In order to clarify the results of Table 4, we
calculate explicitly the NOx-emission from aircraft
type 2. For the LTO cycle 730 kg fuel is used causing
NOx-emission of 10 g 730 kg¼ 7300 g; in the cruise
phase of the flight 2.1 kg of fuel per km is used, which
gives a total of 2.1 500 km¼ 1050 kg fuel use.
The resulting NOx-emission is 9 1050¼ 9450 g;
total NOx-emissions are: 7300þ 9450¼ 16 750 g; at a
capacity utilization of 65% the number of passenger-
kilometres is: 0.65 100 500¼ 32 500; the NOx-
emission per passenger-kilometre is therefore 16 750/
32 500¼ 0.515 g (¼515mg).
Extent to which total production costs are made up
of fuel costs (a). At prices of the year 2000
approximately 10% of total operating costs of
aviation are made up of fuel costs (Hof et al.,
2001). Assuming that fuel costs are fully passed on in
ticket prices an increase of 1% in fuel costs would
therefore lead to an increase of at most 0.1% of the
ticket price.6 We do not take into account the
possibility that the proportion of the ticket price
6 In reality, the increase in the ticket price might be slightly smaller because in addition to operating costs the ticket price
covers overhead costs, profit margins, travel agency costs, etc. The assumption to pass on fuel costs fully to ticket prices is
realistic as long as the share of fuel costs is not a dominant part of the operating costs. Ten per cent is not considered to be
dominant. Only when fuel costs would continue to rise and hence operating costs would make up a larger part of prices, it
would be recommendable to assume that fuel costs are not fully passed on to ticket prices with, for example, 50%.
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due to fuel costs is higher for long distances than for
short distances.
Price elasticity of demand ("p). Brons et al. (2001)
used an extensive database of 37 studies with 204 data
entries for calculating price elasticities of demand for
air travel. The values that came out with the highest
frequency scores were 0.8 for business flights and
1.4 for tourist flights. As nonbusiness flights are
60% of all flights we consider 1.2 as a good estimate
for "p.
Extent of activity (q). In 2001 more than 20million
passengers took flights out of the Netherlands. This is
equal to the number of passenger-kilometres that is
estimated by multiplying the numbers of passengers
per regional destination (second column in Table 5)
by an estimated average distance to each of these
regions (third column of Table 5). The average
distance can be refined by using actual distances of
flights to the destinations. The result is more than
50 billion passenger-kilometres (see Table 5).
Input price (w*). In the 1980s and 1990s the real
price of kerosene fluctuated between E0.10 and
E0.45 per litre. We use E0.20 per litre.
Size of the subsidy (s)
Aviation fuels fall under CN codes 2710 00 51 and
2710 00 55 (light heavy oil) and therefore should
normally be subject to the same excise duty as diesel
fuel. In 2002 the standard rate of excise duty on diesel
in the Netherlands was E0.33 per litre. To the extent
that aviation fuels remain untaxed, this rate can be
considered to be equal to the amount of subsidy
Table 3. Emissions from different types of aircraft over various flown distances
Fuel consumption Emissions (per kg of fuel)
Type*
Number of
seats
Distance
flown (km) kg/LTO**
kg/km in
cruise phase
CO2
(kg)
SO2
(kg)
NOx (g)
LTO
NOx (g)
cruise
VOC (g)
LTO
1 40 200 130 1.0 3.15 0.6 8 7 5
2 100 500 730 2.1 3.15 0.6 10 9 2
3 200 1500 1500 5.1 3.15 0.6 14 12 1
4 400 6000 3100 11 3.15 0.6 18 15 1
Notes: *Dings et al. (2002) do not specify the aircraft type as regards make, number of engines, etc.
**LTO: Landing and Take Off Cycle.
Table 4. Emissions per passenger-kilometre from various types of aircraft
Type Capacity utilization (%)* CO2 (g) SO2 (mg) NOx (mg) VOC (mg)
1 50 260 50 610 163
2 65 173 33 515 45
3 70 137 26 537 7
4 80 113 22 545 2
Note: *Based on Dings et al. (2002).
Table 5. Estimation of the number of passenger-kilometres for air travellers leaving the Netherlands
Destination Number of travellers Average distance (km) Millions of passenger-km
Europe 14 102 546 800 11 282
North Africa 335 597 2500 839
Rest of Africa 495 961 5000 2480
North America 2 571 575 6000 15 429
Rest of America 772 467 8000 6180
Western Asia 678 220 3000 2035
Rest of Asia 1 474 031 8000 11 792
Oceania 9887 16 000 158
Total 20 440 284 50 195
Source: Calculated from Netherlands statistics data; average distances are own estimates.
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per litre. In the Netherlands 3.2 billion kg of aviation
fuel was supplied exempt from excise duty (source:
Netherlands Statistics). Assuming a density of
0.85 kg/l leads to a total amount of subsidy of E1.2
billion/year.
Calculating the economic and environmental
effects. Using Equation 55, the economic effects,
i.e. the change in the quantity of air travel due to the
subsidy, can be calculated as follows:
dq
ds
¼  "p  q
w
s¼ 0:1  ð1:2Þ 50:10
9
0:20
0:33¼ 9:9 109
The result shows that the exemption leads to an
increase of annual passenger kilometres by plane
equal to 9.9 billion kilometres. This is 20% of the
total number of annual passenger kilometres.
The environmental effects can now be estimated
by combining the information on the number of
passenger kilometres (Table 5) with the information
on the emissions (Table 4). The results are reported in
Table 6. In order to clarify these results we calculate
the NOx-emission from aircraft type 2 for flights to
European destinations: NOx emission per passenger-
kilometre flows by aircraft 2 is 0.515 g; the number of
passenger-kilometres (11 282 million) is 20% higher
than in a world with excised duties on kerosene.
Hence 2234 million passenger-kilometres are
caused by the exemption. This leads to an estimate
of NOx-emissions equal to 0.000515 2234¼
1.15051million kg¼ 1151 ton.
The final step is aggregating the environmental
effects to the four pollution categories as defined
in Appendix A. These are reported in Table 7. The
environmental effects are 1.3 megatonne CO2-equiva-
lents and 2.4 kilotonne SO2-equivalents (based on
parameters chosen).
Sensitivity analysis. The method is based on linear
relationships. Therefore, a change of parameters will
have a proportional effect on the environmental
impact. For example, if the price elasticity takes
values of 0.4 and 2.7, which are the most extreme
values in ranges reported by Oum et al. (1990), the
environmental effects will be 2/3 lower and more than
2 times higher, respectively than the numbers
reported in Tables 6 and 7.
Conclusion of the case study. Fuel for international
air traffic is exempt from excise duty. This is based
on international treaties as well as national and EU
regulations. This exemption is a subsidy as it means
lower costs for the aviation sector. In particular, it is
a subsidy on an input of a production activity.
For the Netherlands the size of this subsidy amounts
to approximately E1.2 billion/year. The subsidy
provokes an estimated 20% more passenger kilo-
metres. The important environment impacts are the
greenhouse effect, acidification, photochemical ozone
creation and eutrophication.
Since artificially low aviation fuel prices may cause
a break on technological innovation of aviation
engines as well as provide a weak incentive to utilize
air planes up to their full capacity, the estimates of
Table 6. Estimation of the environmental effect of subsidizing aviation fuel for flights leaving the Netherlands
Regional destination Aircraft type CO2 (ktonnes) SO2 (tonnes) NOx (tonnes) VOC (tonnes)
Europe 2 385 73 1151 100
North Africa 3 23 4 89 1
Rest of Africa 4 56 11 267 1
North America 4 346 66 1664 5
Rest of America 4 139 26 666 2
Western Asia 3 55 11 216 3
Rest of Asia 4 265 50 1272 4
Oceania 4 4 1 17 0
Total 1272 242 5344 116
Table 7. Environmental indicators for exemption of excise
duties on aviation fuel in the Netherlands
Pollution category Emissions
Greenhouse effect
(ktonnes of CO2-equivalents)
1272
Acidification (tonnes
SO2-equivalents)
2433
Photochemical ozone creation
(tonnes ethylene-equivalents)
208
Eutrophication (tonnes
phosphate-equivalents)
695
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the environmental impacts offered here should be
regarded as lower bounds.
V. Conclusions
We have presented a method to assess the environ-
mental (and economic) impact of indirect subsidies.
The method allows to examine the magnitude and
environmental effects of indirect subsidies, as behav-
ioural responses are central to the analysis. In
addition, the method is transparent in the sense that
the influence of changes in parameter values can be
easily traced. All these features make the method
useful for policy analysis, both ex ante (preparation
of policy) and ex post (evaluation of policy). More
costly and laborious, multi-sector GE models can be
used if it is suspected that indirect effects are
significant.
A number of subsidies in the agricultural, energy
and transport and tourism sectors have been analysed
to illustrate and test the method. These sectors
contain subsidies that are suspected to have very
distortionary effects on the economy and to create
sizeable environmental effects. Results of an applica-
tion of the method were presented for eight different
subsidies. The application of the method to one
subsidy, namely the exemption of excise taxes on
aviation fuels, was presented in full detail.
The applications show that sizable indirect sub-
sidies can bring about relatively large environmental
impacts (as summarized in Table 2). This is particu-
larly true for the subsidies provided through the
designation of agricultural land, exemption from the
energy tax and milk price support. These subsidies
interfere at an early stage in the production–
consumption chain, allowing the impact to be
strongly felt, in a prolonged way. The excise tax
exemption for aviation fuels also has a substantial
environmental impact. In all cases the sensitivity of
demand for price plays an important role.
Comparison of the results with environmental
policy goals shows that if the small set of eight
subsidies considered here would not exist, already
30% of the required reduction in greenhouse gases,
and 46% of the required reduction in acidifying
emissions in the Netherlands in 2002, would have
been achieved. This should be an incentive for policy
makers to seriously consider removing various
indirect subsidies, particularly in the areas of
agriculture, energy and transport.
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Appendix A. Weighting Factors used to Calculate Environmental Indicators
Table A1 contains the weighting factors that are used to calculate environmental indicators. These factors are
based on VNCI (2001).
Table A1. Weighting factors for calculating environmental indicators
Category m Greenhouse effect Acidification Photochemical ozone creation Eutrophication
Effect n
CO2 1
N2O 310
CH4 21 0.006
NOx (as NO2) 0.41 0.028 0.13
SO2 1
NH3 1.30 0.35
VOC 0.5*
CO 0.027
Phosphate 1
Nitrate 0.1
Notes: *There is no general rule for the composition of (aggregated) VOC emissions, as the composition differs from case to
case. The weighting factor of 0.5 reflects an average of the weighting factors encountered for VOCs Emissions in the EPI
method. These cover the range of 0.1 to 1.0 (the reference substance with a weighting factor of 1.0 is ethylene).
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